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S I A T E M E N I OF J URISDIC 1 ION
f!

i- r'c-x\r

- - * i ii;i jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§§ 78A-3-102(3)G), 78A-4-103(2)0') (2008).
ISSUES AND s i A A I J A K O u t K E A »E v%
Did the tria 1 : -oi lit abi lse its discretion when it granted I}efendant/Counterclaimant
Mobi-Light, Inc.'s ("Mobiinihf"! motion for -.auctions and entered default judgment
against Plaintiff/Counterclaim-defendant:; i u>

\igiiL ; ;.-. A\d Counterclaim-defendants

Is K I\ lachinery P T\ I td ("K K Machinery ") and Pai ll I a Mai r (collects el>
"DayNight") on the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, [Tenth, and Thirteenth
Claims for Relief in Mobilighfs First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party
Complaint, granting a pei manent inji mc tion against Day] light, and ordei iiig Day Night to
pay Mobilighfs costs and attorney fees. Specifically, DayNight asserts the following
issues on appeal:
I.

T h e district court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions loi

s|>ohiitiuii i>I I' iidi in v IIIIM-II 1111 in- is iin i \nU nee that DayNight destroyed Mr.
Rowe's laptop willfully or in bad faith a n d when there is no evidence that DayNight
engaged in a p a t t e r n of egregious beha\ ior by disregarding cour; ->: «ers.
Preservation! ' I his issi le w as pi esei \ ed ii i tlie i ecoi d ii i DayN igl it's 1\ len lorai ldum
in Opposition to Defendant Mobilight Inez s Motion fojr Terminating Sanctions (R.
561 -71) and in the Hearing on Motion for Sanctions (iL 874; 16-26).
Standard of Review: • ,i

.

''!'.i iir! '' ; *". - i V

'

-

discretion in selecting and imposing sanctions for discovery violations. . . . Appellate
1

-I

courts may not interfere with such discretion unless abuse of discretion in selecting which
sanction to impose may be shown 'only if there is either an erroneous conclusion of law
or no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling.'" Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127,
If 15, 981 P.2d 407 (quoting Morton v. Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah
1997)); see also Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., 2006 UT App 48,^[9,
129P.3d287.
II.

The district court abused its discretion by imposing the "extreme

sanction" of default judgment on DayNight
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the record in DayNight5 s Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendant Mobilight Inc/s Motion for Terminating Sanctions (R. 56171) and in the Hearing on Motion for Sanctions (R. 874:16-26).
Standard of Review: The Utah Supreme Court has stated that
the extreme sanction of default or dismissal must be tempered by the careful
exercise of judicial discretion to assure that its imposition is merited. . .. The
sanction of default judgment is justified where there has been a frustration of the
judicial process, viz, where the failure to respond to discovery impedes trial on the
merits and makes it impossible to ascertain whether the allegations of the answer
have any factual merit.
W.W. & W.B. Gardner Inc. v. Park West Village. Inc.. 568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1977).
Moreover, in Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 1995 Utah LEXIS 20 (Utah ] 995),
the court similarly held that a district court must exercise restraint when imposing the
sanction of default judgment: t;[w]hen the sanction imposed is that of a default judgment,
the most severe of sanctions, the trial court's range of discretion is more narrow than
when the court is imposing less severe sanctions.'' Id.

2

III.

1 he district court abused its discretion in determining the amoun-

attoi iiej, fees and costs to award Mobilight without apportioning the fees and costs
expended.
Preservation: 'iius issue was preserved in the record in Dax- -^iini - :viciiirr;::..: i
it i Opposition to Mobilight Ii ic.'s I\ lotion fori :;"ii lal Entry of Default Judgment (R.
726-31).
Standard of Review: The district coun hu> "*bi<Kiu discretion n\ viL.crn.iiLi;^ *\hat

discretion standard." Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, ^127, 130 i\3d 325 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
S I A I EMEN' I OF I 'HE CASE
Mobilight is in the business of designing, manufacturing and selling portable light
towers and other equipment. In July 2005, Mr. William Cory Rowe began working for
Mobilight Iti December JWU-;.. :.a. i^)\\ ^ became 1\ lobilighf $ operations manau.T .i:*-.
held that position i mtil he ei ided his employ ii lent with IV! :)bi.light 311 A

: S. 2l)n&.

Upon ending his employment with Mobilight, Mr. Rowe began working w ith M • Paul
LaMarr and DayNight, \ .M on a new business ventuie r(I w met; M\ .VLIM w v\..,= design,
manufact I ire, and sell diffei ent, n lore expensive, portable light tow ers
While employed with Mobilight, Mi. Rowe used a pergonal Sony portable laptop
computer in the performance of his job duties. During his exit interview . Mr Rowe
d.'^c.i.sM.i

.•.-•.:•; I- *" * •

- loin's pre - > • i -

!<•*•• -'vr

Mr. Johnson gave Mr. Rowe pennission to leave without erasing or returning any

information because the information on the laptop was old and outdated. Still, after Mr.
Rowe began working for DayNight, Mobilight began harassing Mr. Rowe to return the
hard drive. Mr. Rowe refused to return the laptop to Mobilight because the laptop also
contained DayNight's confidential information. In an attempt to avoid any other
problems regarding the laptop, and to illustrate to Mobilight that DayNight was not using
any of Mobilight's proprietary information, Mr. Rowe and Mr. LaMarr destroyed the
laptop.
Mobilight moved for discovery sanctions because, according to Mobilight, the
evidence on Mr. Rowe's hard drive was essential to proving its case against DayNight.
The district court awarded sanctions to Mobilight by granting default judgment on the
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Claims for Relief in
Mobilight's First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, and awarding
attorney fees and costs to Mobilight. The district court entered its final judgment
pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on November 16, 2009.
DayNight now appeals the district court's final judgment awarding sanctions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS3
Mobilight9s background and business information.

A,
1.

Mobilight is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in West

Jordan, Utah. (R. 330).

1

In an effort to marshal the evidence, DayNight recites many of the facts included in the
district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning Mobilight's motion for
preliminary injunction. Naturally, DayNight does not necessarily agree with the courf s
findings.
4

2.

Ross Johnson is the president and CEO of Mobilight. Mr. Johnson started

Mobilightinl994. (R. 881:57).
3.

Mobilight is in the business of designing, manufacturing and selling portable light

towers, as well as other power equipment. Mobilight sells these light towers to dealers
and end users worldwide, including Australia, North America and South America. (R.
331; 584; 881:57-59).
4.

Mobilight holds certain confidential proprietary informlation, including trade

secrets, regarding the design, manufacture and sale of its products. (R. 584; 881:94-101).
5.

Mobilight also considers its business and customer information to be confidential

information. (R. 584; 881:99-100).
6.

Mobilight has taken efforts to maintain the confidentiality of its information,

including, but not limited to, the application of confidentiality agreements with
employees and suppliers, use of password protected computet data files, and the limit of
its employees' access to confidential information on a uneed to know" basis. (R. 584;
881:101-105).
7.

Still, much of Mobilight's confidential information is in the public domain,

including certain manufacturing and component specifications listed on Mobilighf s web
site. (R. 881:48-52, 106-07).
8.

Mobilight"1 s geographic market includes Australia, North America, and South

America. (R. 331; 584).

5

B.

Mr. Rowe's employment with Mobilight.

9.

Mr. Rowe began working for Mobilight in July 2005. Prior to employment with

Mobilight, Mr. Rowe was a retail sales clerk for the R.C. Willey furniture company. He
had no previous experience working with portable light towers. (R. 883:48).
10.

Mr. Rowe had some college at Salt Lake Community College prior to his

employment with Mobilight, where he took electronics classes, math classes, computer
classes, and physics classes. In fact, he was attending the community college on a
robotics scholarship for winning a robotics competition. (R. 883:43-46).
11.

Mr. Rowe also had a hobby of building and rebuilding cars. (R. 883:46-48).

12.

Initially, Mr. Rowe was hired at Mobilight to work on government contracts for

Mobilight. He then began sales and eventually became Mobilight's operations manager.
R. 881:110-12; 883:48, 51-53).
13.

Mr. Rowe's job duties as operations manager included managing the daily

activities of the manufacturing/production teams, directing the shop quality control
programs, developing improvements in both product quality and processes, planning
production schedules and deliverables, overseeing production budgets and reporting
financial matters to Mobilight's chief financial officer and chief operating officer. (R.
584; 881:13; Defendant's Ex. 1).
14.

In performing these responsibilities, Mr. Rowe gained access to Mobilight's

confidential information. (R.584; 881:113-14).
15.

Upon beginning work with Mobilight, Mr. Rowe was required to sign a Property

Protection Agreement (UPPA"), dated July 15, 2005. (R. 584-85; 883:49).
6

16.

In the PPA, Mr. Rowe acknowledged that Mobilight holds confidential

information and agreed that he would never use or disclose any of Mobilight's
confidential information. The PPA also prohibited Mr. Rowe from making or
manufacturing any work derivative from or in any way similaif to Mobilight5s creative
works, either during his employment or after temiination of his employment. (R. 584-85;
883:49-50).
C.

Business dealings between Mobilight and KK Machinery.

17.

In 2007, Mobilight entered into discussions with KK Machinery regarding the

possibility of KK Machinery distributing Mobilight's light toyers to different rental
companies and end-users in Western Australia. (R. 881:128-^2; 882:179-83).
18.

As a result of these discussions, Mr. LaMarr, personally and on behalf of KK

Machinery, signed a PPA dated June 20, 2007. According to |the PPA, Mr. LaMarr
promised never to use or disclose any of Mobilight's confidential information, nor to
make or manufacture any works derivative from or in any way similar to Mobilight's
creative works. (R. 586 R. 881:132-35).
19.

Tliroughout these discussions, Mobilight represented tp KK Machinery that their

light towers were compliant with Australia's safety regulations. (R. 882:81-82).
20.

On August 14, 2007, KK Machinery and Mobilight entered into a Distribution

Agreement in which KK Machinery was granted distributors^ rights for Mobilight
products in Western Australia. (R. 586-87).
21.

In paragraph 5(e) of the Distributorship Agreement between Mobilight and KK

Machinery, KK Machinery promised that as the distributor, i\ would not disclose, at any
7

time, any confidential business information that it obtained from Mobilight, which
information was not specifically intended for public use of distribution by KK
Machinery. (R. 587).
22.

Throughout the course of the Distributorship Agreement, KK Machinery and Mr.

LaMarr had access to and learned Mobilight's confidential information. Mr. Johnson
gave Mr. LaMarr special training for a total of approximately four or five days regarding
Mobilight's light tower business and explained to Mr. LaMarr the process of
manufacturing Mobilight's light towers. (R. 587; 881:136-158).
23.

However, after KK Machinery received its first shipment of light towers from

Mobilight, it was unsatisfied with the quality of Mobilight's light towers and shortly
thereafter discovered that the light towers were not compliant with Australia's safety
regulations, as represented by Mobilight. (R. 882:195-202, 207).
24.

Mr. La Marr contacted Mobilight to express its concern with the light towers, but

did not receive much cooperation from Mobilight. (R. 882:203).
25.

Mr. LaMarr did express satisfaction with Mr. Rowe's responsiveness to KK

Machinery's needs. (R. 882:203).
26.

KK Machinery expended a significant amount of money and time trying to make

Mobilight's light towers meet the Australian compliance requirements. (R. 882:213-14).
27.

On April 9, 2008, Mr. Karl Prall and Mr. LaMarr of KK Machinery personally

came to Mobilight's facilities in West Jordan, Utah. (R. 881:161; 882:214).

8

28.

Mr. LaMarr testified that he and Mr. Prall came to Utah to discuss Mobilighf s

lack of help in making Mobilight's light towers compliant with Australian safety
regulations. (R. 882:214).
29.

However, Mr. Johnson testified that prior to their arrival in Utah, Mr. Prall and

Mr. LaMarr requested a meeting with Mobilight, but they did uot explain their desire for
a meeting with Mobilight or the purpose for their visit. (R. 88 \: 161).
30.

Before their meeting began, Mr. Prall and Mr. LaMarr received a tour of

Mobilight's facilities. (R. 881:162).
31.

During the meeting on April 9, 2008, KK Machinery stated that Mobilight needed

to pay for KK Machinery's expenses in making the Mobilight light towers Australian
compliant. (R. 882:214).
32.

Mobilight responded that it was under no obligation to pay those expenses under

the Distributor Agreement and the parties began fighting. (R.|881:162-64; 882:216-17).
33.

Mr. Prall and Mr. LaMarr then cancelled an order for Mobilight light towers and

later the parties terminated the Distributor Agreement. The parties both signed a preprepared document for the parties to sign effectuating the termination. (R. 881:162-64;
882:216-17).
D.

Mr. Rowe's termination of employment with Mobilight.

34.

Mr. Rowe voluntarily ended his employment with Mobilight on April 18, 2008.

(R. 585; 881:26-28).
35.

In January 2008, thi'ee months prior to Mr. Rowe terminating his employment with

Mobilight, Mr. Rowe had a conversation with Margaret Johnkom Mobilighf s vice9

president. During this conversation, Ms. Jolinson was stunned when Mr. Rowe indicated
he was unhappy with his employment and suggested that he and Ms. Johnson could open
their own mobile light tower business. (R.585; 881:30-32).
36.

However, although Ms. Johnson is married to Mr. Johnson, the president and CEO

of Mobilight, she didn't mention this conversation with Mr. Rowe to her husband until a
few months after the conversation took place. (R. 881:33-36).
37.

When Mr. Rowe finally did end his employment with Mobilight in April 2008, he

had an exit interview with Mr. Johnson, during which Mr. Rowe told Mr. Johnson that he
was leaving Mobilight to pursue his studies. (R. 881:167; 883:56-58).
38.

Also during this exit interview, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Rowe discussed Mr. Rowe's

personal laptop computer. Mr. Johnson allowed Mr. Rowe to keep his personal laptop
without inspecting it or deleting any files from it because the laptop belonged to Mr.
Rowe and contained outdated information. (R. 883:67-68).
39.

After leaving Mobilight, Mr. Rowe received multiple phone calls from Mr.

Michael Gulbraa, Mobilight's chief operating officer, asking Mr. Rowe if he was
planning on working for DayNight, LLC. (R. 881:276-78).
40.

Mr. Rowe gave evasive and ambiguous responses to Mobilight as to why he was

leaving employment with Mobilight. (R. 585; 881:276-78).
41.

Finally, Mr. Rowe told Mr. Gulbraa that he was, in fact, working for KK

Machinery. (R. 881:279-80).

10

E.

Formation of DayNight, LLC.

42.

The business name of DayNight, LLC was registered with the Utah Department of

Commerce on March 19, 2008. (R. 587).
43.

The business of DayNight, LLC was registered with the Utah Department of

Commerce on June 12, 2008. (R. 587).
44.

KK Machinery was in a joint venture with DayNight, LLC for the design

manufacture, and sale of DayNight's portable light tower. (R.| 587).
45.

KK Machinery and DayNight are direct competitors to Mobilight in the light

tower market. (R. 587).
46.

KK Machinery, DayNight, LLC, and Mr. LaMarr are new to the portable light

tower industry; they had no experience in the industry prior tc\ KK Machinery entering
into the Distribution Agreement with Mobilight. (R. 587; 883:7-10).
47.

Mr. LaMarr was a member and general manager of DayNight, LLC. (R. 330).

48.

After Mr. Rowe left his employment with Mobilight, he began to work officially

for KK Machinery and DayNight in a position similar to his position at Mobilight. (R.
588).
49.

In March 2008, while Mr. Rowe was still employed by Mobilight, Mr. Rowe

began communicating with Mr. LaMarr via email about locating commercial space for
DayNight's new competing business and locating and pricing component parts for
DayNight's competing portable light towers. (R. 883:14-17))
50.

Mr. Rowe testified that some of the documents he creited while working at

Mobilight were for the new light tower product at DayNight. Mr. Rowe further testified
11

that he kept his work for DayNight a secret, primarily because he believed that his
potential for growth at Mobilight was limited and that he did not have a future with
Mobilight.
51.

(R. 883:54-58, 118-20).

However, even though he did actually perform some job functions while still

employed at Mobilight, Mr. Rowe and Mr. LaMarr also testified that they both took steps
to keep Mobilight information confidential and separate. (R. 883:70-75).
E.

Differences between the Mobilight light tower and the DayNight light tower.

52.

Mobilight asserts that the identities of its suppliers are part of Mobilight's

confidential information. The district court found that using this information, DayNight
has contacted certain Mobilight suppliers about components for the DayNight light tower.
(R. 589).
53.

However, Mr. Rowe testified that he came across these suppliers because these

suppliers maintain public businesses and are accessible through various public media.
(R. 883:78-84).
54.

DayNight used over thirty suppliers in building its light tower. Only three of the

suppliers it used were also Mobilight suppliers: MetalFab, Henderson Wheel, and
Anixter International. (R. 882:222-23).
55.

Employees of all three of these suppliers testified that Mr. Rowe and Mr. LaMarr

specifically asked them not to discuss anything that Mobilight has ordered, manufactured,
or used in building Mobilighf s light tower. (R. 882:116-118; 126-128; 136-38).
56.

All of the components used for its light tower are '"off the shelf components while

many of Mobilight's components are custom made. (R. 883:84).
12

57.

DayNight's light tower has similar components to Mobilight's light tower

including a diamond plated front panel and a laser-cut rear panel, a hydraulicallyoperated light mast, the same make and model gasoline motor, a bank of parabolic
reflector lights, push-pull cables similar to those used in Mobilight's towers, and an axle
assembly and electrical cables. (R. 591)
58.

However, many of the similarities between the Mobilight light tower and the

DayNight light tower could also be seen between any of the li^ht towers on the market.
Many of the design specifications and the component parts of the Mobilight light tower
are in the public domain, including being listed on Mobilight'$ own website. Any
purchaser of a Mobilight light tower would know the general components and designs of
the Mobilight light tower that are similar to the DayNight light tower, as well as to other
light towers on the market. (R.881:48-51).
59.

There are also significant differences between the Mobilight light tower and the

DayNight light tower. In fact, DayNight's expert witness at the hearing for preliminary
injunction testified that the two light towers are "radically different." These differences
include the hydraulic ram designs, light mast designs, chassis structure, light systems
designs, and stabilizer legs. (R. 591-92; 883:151-52).
F.

Mr. Rowe's personal laptop computer.

60.

While employed at Mobilight, Mr. Rowe used a personal, portable laptop

computer in the performance of his job duties. His laptop contained certain confidential
infonnation, data and files downloaded from Mobilighf s computer network. This
downloaded infonnation included data regarding Mobilight*$ product designs,
13

manufacturing, processes, customers, sales methods, business operations, specifications,
fmancials, supply costs and pricing. (R. 586; R. 883:65-66).
61.

On June 2, 2008, Mr. Gulbraa asked Mr. Rowe for the laptop he used while

employed at Mobilight or the hard drive from that laptop. Mr. Gulbraa also asked Mr.
Rowe to return Mr. Rowe's cell phone that he used during his employment at Mobilight.
(R. 588; 881:283-84).
62.

Mr. Rowe said that he would have to check with Mr. Karl Prall of KK Machinery

and Mr. LaMarr before he gave either of these things to Mobilight. (R. 588; R 881:284).
63.

Mr. Johnson and Mr. Gulbraa of Mobilight offered to give Mr. Rowe a new hard

drive for his computer so that he could keep his computer. (R. 588; 881:283).
64.

Mr. Rowe did not give the hard drive to Mobilight because his computer also

contained information concerning DayNight. (R. 588; 883:94).
65.

Throughout June and July 2008, Mobilight continued to harass Mr. Rowe and Mr.

LaMarr about giving the laptop computer or the laptop computer's hard drive to
Mobilight (R. 881:283-84; 883:93-94).
66.

On July 25, 2008, Daynight filed a lawsuit against Mobilight for trespass. (R. 1-6)

67.

On July 30, 2008, Mr. Rowe and Mr. LaMarr destroyed the laptop that Mr. Rowe

had used while working at Mobilight by throwing the laptop off a building and driving
over it with a truck. (R. 588; 882:99).
68.

Mr. Rowe also refused to give his cell phone and his cell number (801) 755-9395

to Mobilight, even though Mobilight had paid for that cell number while Mr. Rowe was
employed at Mobilight. (R. 589; 883:68-69).
14

69.

On June 2, 2008, Mr. Rowe told Mr. Gulbraa that KK Machinery was now paying

for Mr. Rowers cell phone. (R. 589; 881:284).
70.

Mr. Rowe testified that he had the cell number prior to beginning work at

Mobilight and he did not want to get a new cell phone number since he had been using
that for all of his personal needs as well. (R. 883:68).
71.

On September 5, 2008, the district court ordered Mr. Rowe to return the sim card

on the cell phone to Mobilight. Mr. Rowe returned the cell phone sim card, but the sim
card was clear. (R.589).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING
TERMINATING SANCTIONS AGAINST DAYNIGHT WHEN DAYNIGHT
DID NOT ACT WILLFULLY OR IN BAD FAITH AND DID NOT
CONSISTENTLY DISREGARD COURT ORDERfS.
The district court abused its discretion in sanctioning DayNight, thereby awarding

Mobilight default judgment on its First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and
Thirteenth Claims for Relief, granting Mobilight a permanent injunction against
DayNight, and ordering DayNight to pay Mobilight's attorney fees and costs. Rule 37(g)
of the Civil Rules of Utah Procedure provides that a court may impose sanctions under
rule 37(b)(2) "if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or fails to preserve a
document, tangible item, electronic data or other evidence in violation of a duty." Utah
R. Civ. Pro. 37(g) (emphasis added).2 "Rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure [then] authorizes the district court to sanction a party who 'fails to obey an
~ DayNight notes that there is no Utah case law interpreting i~ule 37(g) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
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order' of the court during discovery." Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement Inc., 2008 UT
82, ^j22, 199 P.3d 957 (emphasis added).
In reviewing a district court's imposition of sanctions, the appellate court follows
a two-step process. First, the appellate court reviews the district court's factual findings
to ensure that the district court found the offending party's behavior to merit sanctions.
See id. at ^23. And second, once the district court has made the finding that the
offending party's behavior merits sanctions, the appellate court "will only disturb the
sanction if 'abuse of discretion [is] clearly shown.'" Id, (alteration in original).
A.

The district court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions
against DayNight and awarded default judgment to Mobilight
because its decision lacked an evidentiary basis,

A district court can only impose sanctions under rule 37(b)(2) if the district court
finds "willfulness, bad faith, fault or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial
process." Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999UTApp 127416,981 P.2d407. Regarding the rule's
willful or bad faith requirement, the court has stated that "[t]he willfulness requirement
cannot be satisfied by showing mere prejudice. Rather, there must be evidence that the
noncompliance was the product of willful failure." Killpatrick, 2008 UT 82, ^[24.
Regarding the rule's fault requirements, the court likewise explained that the fault
requirement can only be satisfied when fault is accompanied by additional willful
behavior. See id. ^ 30-31.
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that willful behavior is typically found
when the offending party has engaged in a consistent pattern of disregarding court orders
or discovery requirements. Utah case law clearly illustrates this point.
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In Kilpatrick v.Bullough Abatement, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a
district court's order sanctioning the plaintiffs for failing to obtain an autopsy following
their husbands' deaths and dismissing the plaintiffs' wrongful death claims. 2008 UT 82,
^21. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in
dismissing the plaintiffs' claims because there was no evidence that the plaintiffs'
behavior was willful. See id. ^24. The court's refusal to find willfulness was based in
part on the fact that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a consistent pattern of behavior
disregarding court orders or discovery requirements, holding that "[i]n cases meriting
sanctions, there is often a consistent pattern of behavior disregarding discovery
requirements or court orders, as well as evidence that the sanctioned party is on notice
that its pattern of behavior will result in sanctions if it continues." Id. ^35 (emphasis
added). The court then noted several Utah cases illustrating this point. Id.; see Utah
Dept. of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 1995 Utah LEXI$ 20 (upholding the district
court's sanctioning where the offending party had received "riumerous notices, motions,
and orders" for discovery from the court and the opposing party and was on notice that
this pattern would result in sanctions); Arnica Mut. Ins. v. Scfrettler, 768 P.2d 950, 95455, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding that "a pattern of aggravated misconduct in the
fomi of willful and deliberate disobedience of discovery orders, fabricated testimony, and
witness tampering" justified sanctions); First Fed. Sav. & Lo^n Ass'n. v. Schamanek, 684
P.2d 1257, 1261 (Utah 1984) (holding that the non-complying party refused to respond to
requests for admission, produce documents, and answer deposition questions, and
continued to refuse to do these things even after the court entered an order compelling
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discovery). Clearly, the Utah case law unequivocally illustrates that behavior justifying
an imposition of sanctions requires a pattern of disregarding court orders during the
discovery process. Such behavior is seemingly a must for any finding of willfulness or
bad faith.
In this case, the district court lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis for determining
that DayNight's behavior was willful or in bad faith. The district court made no finding
of willfulness or bad faith. After the hearing on Mobilighf s motion for preliminary
injunction, the district court entered findings that Mr. Rowe and Mr. LaMarr "purposely"
destroyed the laptop. In its final judgment, the court found that Mr. Rowe and Mr.
LaMarr "intentionally" destroyed the laptop. However, these findings do not indicate
that Mr. Rowe and Mr. LaMarr's behavior was willful or in bad faith.
DayNight acknowledges that a district courf s failure to provide a factual finding
does not necessarily result in reversal of the district court's order. See Kilpatrick, 2008
UT 82, %19. The court noted that "the district court's failure to make a specific finding of
willfulness, bad faith, or fault 'is not grounds for reversal if a full understanding of the
issues on appeal can nevertheless be determined by the appellate court.'" Id. (quoting
Schettler, 768 P.2d at 962 (holding that the record demonstrated willful disobedience of
court orders, even though the district court made no finding of willfulness below)).
Still, the record evidence does not demonstrate the willfulness or bad faith that is
required to justify the imposition of sanctions. It is true that the district court found that
DayNight "purposely" and "intentionally" destroyed Mr. Rowers laptop; however, the
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evidence does not support that any intentional fault attributed to DayNight was
accompanied by the necessary additional willful behavior.
In arguing that DayNight acted willfully, Mobilight selected one or two quotes
from the video recording of the destruction of the laptop, but ignored the majority of Mr.
LaMarr's statements in the same recording indicating that Mr. LaMarr and Mr. Rowe had
no bad faith intention. Throughout the video, Mr. LaMarr makes it clear that they are
destroying the laptop to stop Mobilight from harassing DayNight and to show Mobilight
that DayNight is not using the laptop. Mr. LaMarr specifically states the following:
•

"We have not used [Mr. Rowe's] laptop. We h^ve not in any way used the
information that he gleaned from Mobilight. Wp think it best to destroy it."

•

"I do testify that we have not in any way copied any of the data that comes
from Mobilight's register of potential or alleged intellectual property. We
have no desire in any way, shape, or form to copy their product or service
to mimic in any way their business practices and therefore this is why we
want to do this. To end this problem once and for all."

Mr. LaMarr and Mr. Rowe also both testified at the preliminary injunction hearing
regarding why they destroyed the laptop. Their explanation Was reasonable given
Mobilight's harassment and overbroad request for the entire hard drive of the laptop,
which contained virtually all of DayNight's work product as well. Moreover, Mr. Rowe
and Mr. LaMarr* s explanations are reasonable considering their lack of sophistication and
experience in corporate litigation matters. DayNight displayed no malicious intent to
destroy evidence in either the video recording or during live testimony. Similar to the
Kilpatrick case, where the plaintiffs behavior was reasonably given the circumstances,
see 2008 UT 82, ^]38, DayNight's explanation for its behavior is also reasonable given the
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circumstances surrounding the destruction of the laptop. Thus, there is an insuffient
evidentiary basis of willfulness or bad faith to support the imposition of sanctions on
DayNight.
Furthermore, there is no record evidence indicating that DayNight intentionally
disobeyed court orders. In fact, in this case there were no repeated court instructions to
DayNight to provide the laptop's hard drive to Mobilight. DayNight filed its lawsuit
against Mobilight on July 25, 2008, alleging trespass and other related claims. The video
recording of the destruction of the laptop was made on July 30, 2008. Although the
laptop was destroyed after the litigation had begun, discovery in this case had not yet
begun at the time the laptop was destroyed. There had been no court orders or discovery
requests for the laptop pursuant to the litigation when the laptop was destroyed. In fact,
and more importantly, at the time the laptop was destroyed, Mobilight had not yet filed
its responsive pleadings alleging its trade secrets claims. Mobilight didn't file its answer
and counterclaim in this case until August 22, 2008—over three weeks after the laptop
had already been destroyed. DayNight's behavior in destroying the laptop was not
willful or in bad faith and it cannot be attributed to DayNight's intentional fault because
DayNight did not demonstrate "a consistent pattern of behavior disregarding discovery
requirements or court orders." Id. ^[35.
B.

The district court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions
because it made an erroneous conclusion of law regarding the
material facts necessary in proving trade secret claims.

Second, after looking at whether the district court made an adequate finding of fact
to merit sanctions, this court then determines whether the district court abused its
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discretion in ordering sanctions to DayNight. See id., TJ23. "An abuse of discretion may
be demonstrated by showing that the district court relied on can erroneous conclusion of
law' or that there was 'no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling.5" Id (quoting
Morton, 938 P.2d at 274.
As discussed above, the district court's imposition of sanctions on DayNight was
an abuse of discretion because the district court lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis for
its ruling. However, even if this court were to find that the record evidence supports a
finding of willfulness, bad faith or fault sufficient to merit sanctions against DayNight,
the district court still abused its discretion in granting Mobilight's motion for sanctions
because it made an erroneous conclusion of law.
Mobilight's case-in-chief centers on a misappropriation of trade secrets claim.
The district court's final judgment on Mobilight's motion for sanctions concludes that
"the destroyed computer was evidence central to proving [Mobilight's] claims, and which
destruction severly prejudiced [Mobilight's] ability to prove its case." This ruling is
erroneous because the laptop evidence is not necessary to proving Mobilight's
misappropriation of trade secrets claim, and the district court's assessment of the
materiality of the laptop in a misappropriation of trade secrets action was wrong.
Mr. Rowe's personal laptop is not essential to proving Mobilight's trade secrets
claims. Instead, the actual light towers will either prove or disprove Mobilight's case. In
its memorandum supporting its motion for sanctions, Mobilight provides no discussion,
or even logical argument, as to why the destruction of the laptop would so prevent them
from effectively litigating their case and would justify such an "extreme" and "unusually
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harsh" remedy as default judgment. Mobilight instead assumes that the laptop contained
information pertinent to the litigation, and then jumps from that assumption to the
conclusion that the laptop was central to Mobilight's proof. When in fact, other
evidence, such as a comparison of the Mobilight light tower to the DayNight prototype
(and the design documents for the prototype), is far more probative than the speculative
information that might have been contained on the laptop. Likewise, if DayNight ever
contacted any of Mobilight's customers (and there is no evidence of such contact),
witnesses would be available to testify of that contact.
Utah law interpreting the Uniform Utah Trade Secret Act, as well as Utah
common law, makes it clear that merely establishing possession of allegedly
"confidential information" is not a sufficient basis to prevail in a trade secret case.
Rather, the allegedly misappropriated material must be used against the party that
developed and owned that information. To prove its claim that Daynight misappropriated
trade secrets, Mobilight must prove tliree elements: (1) the existence of a trade secret, (2)
communication of the trade secret to [defendant] under an express or implied agreement
limiting disclosure of the secret, and (3) [defendant's] use of the secret injures [the
plaintiff]." Water & Energy Systems Tech., Inc. v. Keil 1999 UT 16, ^9, 974 P.2d 821
(Utah 1999).
A key factor in determining whether DayNight misappropriated Mobilight's trade
secrets is whether DayNight actually used the trade secret. As the court in Utah Medical
Products, Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates, Inc. states,

?2

Simply identifying documents and claiming that they contain trade secret
information is not enough. Plaintiff must establish that the infoniiation identified
in the documents is not published or readily ascertainable infoniiation to those in
the field. Additionally, plaintiff has reiterated in deposition and at oral argument
that defendant could not help but use trade secret information in doing what they
were doing. Yet, plaintiff has failed to identify with specificity exactly what trade
secrets were used.
79 F. Supp.2d 1290, 1313 (D. Utah 1999) (emphasis added).
Mobilight makes the same argument in this case, by arguing that DayNight must
have used Mobilight 's confidential information, instead of actually looking at the
DayNight light tower to determine if DayNight actually used Mobilight's confidential
information or identifying any other specific confidential information that was allegedly
misappropriated and used.3 The court in Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625
P.2d 690 (Utah 1981), stated that comparing the products is perhaps the most probative
proof that a party's confidential infoniiation was, in fact, actually used. See id. at 697-98
("[A]n employer to obtain relief must establish that his former employee's product is a
copy of his own product, that its method of production was secret and that the former
employee has used or intends to use confidential infoniiation acquired during his
employment.v (Emphasis added)).
In Water & Energy Systems Tech. Inc. v. KeiL 1999 UT 16, 974 P.2d 821, a trade
secret case, the Utah Supreme Court focused on the similarities and differences of the
two products. The court held that while the plaintiffs formulae were somewhat "similar'

At the preliminary injunction hearing, DayNight presented multiple witnesses, including
various suppliers and an engineering expert, who all testified in DayNight's favor that the
planning, designing, and manufacturing of DayNight" s light tower is completely different
from Mobilight. All of these witnesses were available to Mobilight.
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to defendant's formulae, "significant differences" also existed. See id. ^[11. Again
focusing on the similarities and differences between the products, the court further
explained that "[similarities which can be explained by industry or regulatory demands
cannot suffice to meet the requirements that [defendant] copied [plaintiffs] confidential
formulae, especially in light of the abundant testimony that the formulae were not copied
and the substantial amount of information in the public domain regarding water treatment
chemicals." Id
The laptop computer could not show that DayNight actually used Mobilight5 s
trade secrets in building DayNight's light tower prototype. Even assuming the laptop
might have shown that Mobilighf s confidential information was one the hard drive, that
evidence could not prove that such information was actually used. Conversely, given the
court's holdings in Muna and Keil, Mobilight could, however, still attempt to prove its
case by examining DayNight's product, evaluating how DayNight's light tower was built,
and explaining how any specific trade secrets were used. But Mobilight did not rely on
that information and did not provide any explanation for why it would need the laptop to
prove its case.
DayNight produced significant evidence and testimony to the district court
explicating how the two light towers are "radically different," and Mobilight produced no
such experts or evidence stating the opposite. Instead, Mobilight simply continued to
rely on the destroyed laptop for its evidence to prove that DayNight used Mobilight's
confidential information. Thus, the district court's erroneous conclusion that the
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evidence on the laptop was central to proving Mobilight's claims illustrates the district
court's abuse of discretion in imposing sanctions on DayNightJ
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE
MOST SEVERE SANCTION ON DAYNIGHT BY GRANTING
MOBILIGHT DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
It is axiomatic that Utah courts consider the discovery sanction of default or

dismissal a rare and extreme sanction. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in W.W. &
W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc.,
the extreme sanction of default or dismissal must be tempered by the careful
exercise of judicial discretion to assure that its imposition is merited. . . . The
sanction of default judgment is justified where there has been a frustration of the
judicial process, viz, where the failure to respond to discovery impedes trial on the
merits and makes it impossible to ascertain whether the allegations of the answer
have any factual merit.
568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1977); see also, Dairington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah
App. 1991) ("[Djefault judgment is an unusually harsh sanction that should be meted out
with caution."). It is the requirement for due process that forces a district court to
exercise extreme caution in awarding default judgment: "in the interest of justice and fair
play, [courts] favor, where possible, a full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the
merits of every case." Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 12.
The sanction awarded in this case was extreme and harih, especially given the lack
of willfulness or bad faith in DayNighf s behavior and the faci that the lack of evidence
from the laptop does not "make it impossible to ascertain whether the allegations . ..
have any factual merit." As discussed above, Mobilight is still able to present its case to
a jury without the laptop and instead use other, more appropriate evidence to prove its
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case. Thus, the district court's award of default judgment to Mobilight does not meet the
two-part test set forth in W.W. & W.B. Gardner for imposing such a severe sanction.
Instead of imposing such a harsh sanction, DayNight asserts that there are various
other sanctions under rule 37 that could be imposed that would still allow the parties to
present their cases at trial. DayNight concedes that if this Court allows both Mobilight
and DayNight to present their cases to a jury at trial, Mobilight would receive "a
favorable inference in place of the missing evidence." Killpatrick, 2008 UT 82, ^|39.
DayNight also recognizes that this "unfavorable inference may, as a practical matter,
preclude [or at least impair DayNight] from [effectively] pursuing [its defenses]." Id.
Thus, at a minimum, if this court determines that an imposition of sanctions against
DayNight was appropriate, the district court's imposition of the most severe sanction
against Mobilight was an abuse of discretion because other sanctions combined with the
inferences given in favor of Mobilight at trial would sufficiently punish DayNight.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
AWARDED MOBILIGHT ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS IN THE
AMOUNT OF $120,692.07 AND FAILED TO APPORTION THE FEES
AND COSTS.
In the event that this Court upholds the district court's imposition of sanctions

against DayNight and award of default judgment and attorney fees and costs to
Mobilight, DayNight asserts that the district court erred in determining the amount of
attorney fees and costs awarded to Mobilight. The district court in this case awarded
Mobilight attorney fees and costs in the amount of $120, 692.07 based on the Second
Affidavit of Rinehart L. Peshell for Attorney's Fees and Costs (the "Peshell Affidavit").
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(See R. 842-44). However, in deteraiining this amount, the district court failed to assess
the reasonableness of the attorney fees requested and failed to ensure that Mobilight's
attorneys had properly apportioned the attorney fees and costs|it submitted for collection.
Thus, because Mobilight's attorneys did not apportion their fees and costs, the district
court erred in not denying Mobilighf s requests for attorney fees and costs.
Under Utah law, Mobilight, and ultimately the district court, are required "to
allocate the prevailing party's attorney fees amount those claims for which it is entitled to
an award of attorney fees and those for which it is not." Ellsworth Paulson Constr. Co. v.
51-SPR.LLC 2006 UT App 353, 144 P.3d 261. For this reaspn, the Utah Supreme
Court has instructed that a party seeking to recover attorney fees "'must categorize the
time and fees expended for:
(1)

successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees,

(2)

unsuccessful claims for which there would hav^ been an entitlement to
attorney fees had the claims been successful, an|d

(3)

claims for which there is not entitlement of attorney fees.'"

Foote v. Clarke. 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998) (quoting Cottor^wood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830
P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992)). "If a party fails to properly apportion attorney fees, a
trial court may deny that party's fee requests Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass*n v. Cox, 627
P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981).
In the Peshell Affidavit, Mobilight's attorneys fail to apportion the fees and costs
incurred in litigating Mobilight's First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and
Thirteenth Claims for Relief. Mobilight did not make any distinction between (i) the
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claims for which the Court awarded default judgment and allowed attorney fees, all of
which relate to Mobilighf s trade secret related claims and (ii) the claims remaining to be
tried in this case, which include DayNight's Trespass claim (see R. 4-5); Mobilight's
remaining counterclaims for Intentional Interference with Economic Relations, Common
Law Trademark Infringement, Trademark Dilution, Unpaid invoices, and Unjust
Enrichment (see R. 362-65, 367-69); and KK Machinery's Third Party Complaint
alleging Breach of Contract against Mobilight and Fraud against Ross Johnson (see R.
546-47).
In working on the causes of action for which Mobilight was awarded attorney fees
and costs, Mobilight's attorneys necessarily spent time researching the facts and law
related to these unresolved and untried causes of action. No justification exists for
awarding Mobilight its fees and costs on these undecided claims. Yet, the Peshell
Affidavit, in many places, makes no distinction between the efforts undertaken on
Mobilight's trade secret claims and the claims that a jury will have to resolve in the
future. Instead, the final order providing Mobilight's attorney fees essentially allows
Mobilight to recover all of its attorney fees, regardless of the claims to which those fees
and costs are related.
In fact, many of the time entries submitted by Mr. Peshell are for efforts clearly
unrelated to the claims for which the Court granted default judgment. Mobilight's
attorneys submitted time entries that failed to specify whether the attorney was working
on claims for which the judgment had been granted or for claims that will be resolved in
the future. For example, on a time entry dated August 8, 2008, one of Mobilight's
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attorneys stated that he spent 1.4 hours c,,[r]eview[ing] draft Counterclaim and Crossclaim
on DayNight matter." (R. 791). On another time entry dated August 18, 2008, he spent
2.0 hours "[r]eview[ing] pleadings for counterclaim and crosscjlaim . . . on KK matter/'
(R. 791). Mobilight's Counterclaims have five claims still pending—claims for which
attorney fees were not awarded. There was no apportionment bf the time spent on the
various claims in Mobilight's counterclaims. Still, Mobilight was awarded its fees for all
of that time spent.
The Peshell Affidavit also submits time entries for all of Mobilight's attorneys that
do not relate in any way to Mobilight's efforts to obtain a temporary restraining order, a
preliminary injunction, and/or, finally, default judgment. On November 14, 2008, the
court granted Mobilight's Preliminiary Injunction Order. Nevertheless, the affidavit of
Mobilight's attorney contains multiple time entries dated after November 14, 2008 for
activities related to DayNight and Mobilight claims for which attorney fees and costs
have not been granted. (R. 795-96, 808-812). In fact, Mobilight submitted a $7,000.00
invoice from a private investigator for work that, at least in pah, was conducted well after
the district court granted the preliminary injunction. (R. 824). Additionally, the Peshell
Affidavit asserted extraordinarily high costs for other services. For instance, Mobilight
requested costs for legal research of $400.00 to $600.00 per njonth when a Lexis small
firm package of unlimited legal research cost approximately $450.00. (R. 790).
Mobilight recovered all of the attorney fees and costs it submitted in the Peshell
Affidavit, despite the unreasonableness of those fees and costs. Given the inconsistencies
and the anomalies in the Peshell Affidavit regarding attorney fees and costs, as well as
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Mobilight's failure to apportion those fees and costs, this court should reverse the district
court's award of attorney fees and costs.
At the very least, the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing
regarding the proper amount of damages, attorney fees and costs. Rule 55(b)(2) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[i]f in order to enter judgment or to carry it
into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to
establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other
matter, the court may conduct such hearings . . . as it deems necessary and proper." The
district court awarded Mobilight attorney fees and costs close to one hundred and twentyfive thousand dollars, and part of those fees and costs were based on time and resources
expended on claims other than the claims for which the district court granted default
judgment. DayNight was never allowed the opportunity to examine the requested fees
and costs submitted in the Peshell Affidavit at an evidentiary hearing on those fees.
Thus, at the very least, DayNight requests this court reverse the district court's award of
attorney fees, or in the alternative, for an evidentiary hearing on the attorney fees and
costs awarded to Mobilight.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning DayNight, in
imposing the harshest of sanctions—default judgment, and in awarding attorney fees and
costs without apportioning those fees and costs. First, the district court abused its
discretion in imposing sanctions because there is an insufficient evidentiary basis that
DayNight acted willfully or in bad faith. Moreover, the district court abused its
30

discretion in imposing sanctions because it made an erroneous conclusion of law
concerning the material facts needed to prove Mobilight's trade secret claims. Second,
even if this court were to uphold the district court's imposition of sanctions, the district
court abused its discretion in imposing the most severe and harsh sanction available since
there was no willfulness or bad faith in DayNight's behavior. And third, DayNight
argues that the court erred in awarding attorneys fees and cost$ when those fees and costs
were not apportioned properly. Accordingly, DayNight asks this Court to reverse the
district court's decision to impose sanctions on DayNight and to reverse the district
court's order for default judgment. Oral argument is requested
DATED this 16th day of July 2010.
VANTUS LAW GROUP, P.C.

V_ Richard F. ErM>r
Kari A. Tuft
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of July 2010, two true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT DAYNIGHT, LLC were mailed, by
first class mail, postage pre-paid, to the person(s) named bel(]>w.
Rinehart L. Peshell, Esq.
Matheson & Peshell, LLC
5383 South 900 East, Suite 205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAYNIGHT, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company,
Plaintiff & Counterclaim
Defendant,

:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION ORDER

:

CASE NO.

080913997

vs.
MOBI-LIGHT, INC., a Utah
corporation,

mis mmm e&yggr
Third Judicial District

Defendant & Counterclaim
Plaintiff,

/Wry* 2008
8y

L-MjJ LAKfe COUNTY

—szLJgr.~\

vs.

ueputy Clerk

KKK MACHINERY PTY, LTD., a foreign :
corporation, W. CORY ROWE, an
individual, and PAUL "CACTUS JACK" :
LA MARR, an individual,
Third Party Defendant.

The Preliminary Injunction hearing in the above-entitled matter was
conducted on October 7, 8 and 30, 2008.

Defendant

and counterclaim

plaintiff, Mobi-Light, Inc. ("Mobilight") was present and represented by
its counsel, Rmehart

L. Peshell and Jonathan D. Parry.

DayNight, LLC and third party defendants Cory Rowe
"Cactus Jack" LaMarr

("Mr.

Plaintiff,
Rowe"), Paul

("Cactus Jack"), and KK Machinery Pty, Ltd.

(UKK

Machinery") were present and represented by their counsel, Richard F.
Ensor. During the hearing, the Court received live testimony,
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declarations (the respective requests to use declarations are granted),
other evidence, as well as the argument from counsel upon which the Court
now

issues

the

following

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions

of

Law

and

Preliminary Injunction Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1

The business of Mobilight is the design, manufacture, and sale

of portable light towers and other equipment.
2

Mobilight holds various confidential proprietary information,

including trade secrets, regarding the design, manufacture, and sale of
its products, including business and customer information.
3

Mobilight

confidentiality

of

has
its

taken

reasonable

confidential

efforts

information,

to

maintain

including

but

the
not

limited to the application of confidentiality agreements with employees
and suppliers, use of password-protected computer data files, and the
limit of its employees' access to confidential information on a "need to
know" basis.
4

Mobilight's

geographic

market

includes

Australia,

North

America, and South America.
5
former

Third-Party Defendant William Cory Rowe ("Mr.
Operations

Manager

of

Mobilight,

had

access

to

Rowe") as the
and

learned

Mobilight's confidential information (i.e., its trade secrets) during his
employment with Mobilight, and signed a non-disclosure agreement dated
July 15, 2005 promising never to make any unauthorized use or disclosure
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of Mobilight's confidential information nor to make or manufacture any
work derivative from or in any way similar to Mobilight's creative works,
including after termination of his employment.
6

Mr. Rowe voluntarily ended his employment with Mobilight on

April 18, 2008.

In January 2008, in a conversation with Margret Johnson,

Vice-President of Human Resources for Mobilight, Mr. Rowe stunned Ms.
Johnson by stating that he was unhappy with his employment and suggested
that he and Ms. Johnson could open their own Mobilight business.

In

March of 2008, while Mr. Rowe was still employed by Mobilight, Mr. Rowe
had email communications with Cactus Jack and assisted Cactus Jack and
DayNight

in locating

commercial

space

for DayNight's

new

competing

business and in locating component parts for DayNight's portable light
tower business.

Mr. Rowe admitted during testimony that some of the

documents he created while still working at Mobilight were for the new
product line at DayNight, that he kept his work for DayNight a secret,
because he believed he did not have a future with Mobilight.
7
why

he

Mr. Rowe gave evasive, ambiguous responses to Mobilight as to
was

leaving

employment

with

Mobilight. While

employed

with

Mobilight, Mr. Rowe had access to and was authorized to use certain
confidential information data and files contained in Mobilight's computer
system

and

contained

in

electronic data storage.

CD-ROM

computer

discs

and

other

forms

of
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While employed with Mobilight, Mr. Rowe used a Sony portable

laptop computer in the performance of his job duties and downloaded
certain confidential information data and files from Mobilight's computer
system onto that laptop computer hard drive, including but not limited
to data and files regarding Mobilight1s product designs, manufacturing
process, customers, sales methods, business operations, specifications,
financials, supply costs and pricing.
9

Third-party defendant Paul "Cactus Jack" LaMarr is general

manager of third-party defendant KK Machinery Pty Ltd.
10

Cactus Jack is also a member and general manager of DayNight,

11

KK

LLC.

Agreement

Machinery

on August

and

Mobilight

14, 2007

entered

in which

into

KK Machinery

a

Distribution

was

granted

a

distributorship for Mobilight products in Western Australia.
12

Cactus Jack, personally and on behalf of KK Machinery, signed

a non-disclosure agreement dated June 20, 2007 with Mobilight promising
never

to

make

any

unauthorized

use

or

disclosure

of

Mobilight's

confidential information, nor to make or manufacture any works derivative
from or in any way similar to Mobilight's creative works.
13

In paragraph 5(e) of the Distributor Agreement, KK Machinery

promised that as the Distributor, it would not disclose, at any time, any
confidential business information which Distributor obtained from
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information was not specifically

intended

for

public use or distribution by Distributor.
14

During

Machinery

and

the

course

Cactus

Jack

confidential information

of

had

the

Distributorship

access

to

and

Agreement,

learned

(i.e., its trade secrets).

KK

Mobilight's

Mr. Ross Johnson,

President of Mobilight, gave Cactus Jack special training for a total of
approximately
business.

four

or

five

days

regarding

Mobilight's

light

tower

Cactus Jack also photographed and was explained Mobilight's

process of manufacturing its light towers.
15

The business

name

"DayNight" was

registered

in

the

Utah

Department of Commerce on March 19, 2008.
16

DayNight,

LLC

was

registered

in

the

Utah

Department

venture

with

plaintiff

of

Commerce on June 12, 2008.
17

KK

Machinery

is

in

a

joint

and

counterclaim defendant DayNight, LLC for the design, manufacture, and
sale of portable light towers.
18

KK Machinery and DayNight are direct competitors to Mobilight

in the portable light tower market.
19

KK Machinery, DayNight and Cactus Jack are brand new to the

portable light tower industry, and had no experience in the industry
before

KK

Mobilight.

Machinery

entered

into

its

distribution

agreement

with
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After Mr. Rowe left his employment with Mobilight, he began

work officially for KK Machinery and/or DayNight in a position identical
to or nearly identical to his former Operations Manager position with
Mobilight.
21

On June 2, 2008 Mr. Rowe was requested to return the hard

drive from his laptop computer that contains Mobilight's confidential
proprietary

information,

including

information

regarding

Mobilight's

customers, vendors, costs, pricing, and technical information regarding
Mobilight's production methods. Mr. Rowe was even offered to be given a
brand new hard drive in replacement so he could keep the computer itself.
Mr. Rowe did not give Mobilight the computer or the hard drive. Instead,
Mr. Rowe replied on June 2, 2008 "would have to check with Karl [Prall]
and Cactus Jack of KK Machinery."

The Court finds that Mr. Rowe's

refusal to return the hard drive from his laptop computer which contained
Mobilight's confidential, proprietary trade secret information supports
the reasonable inference and finding that Mr. Rowe intended to wrongfully
use and/or did wrongfully use Mobilight's protected information.
22

On July 30, 2008, Mr. Rowe and Cactus Jack

intentionally

destroyed Mr. Rowe's laptop computer and hard drive that Mr. Rowe had
used while employed with Mobilight and as further described above in
Paragraph 21 above. The intentional destruction of the laptop computer
permanently deprives Mobilight and the Court of the evidence contained
on the laptop computer.

DAYNIGHT V. MOBI-LIGHT
23

PAGE 7

Rowe was further

requested

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS
on June 2, 2008

to return to

Mobilight's control the cell phone number (801) 755-9395 that Mobilight
had paid for and that Mr. Rowe used during his employment at Mobilight.
Mr. Rowe said that he "would have to check with Karl and Cactus Jack of
KK Machinery." Mr. Rowe further admitted in a June 2, 2 008 telephone
conversation that KK Machinery was already paying tis cell phone bill for
number (801) 755-9395.
24

Mr. Rowe refused to return control of the (801) 755-9395 cell

phone number to Mobilight until he was ordered by the Court to do so on
September 5, 2008.
25

Prior to the return to Mobilight of the SIM card for the cell

phone assigned to the (801) 755-9395 cell phone number, the data from the
SIM card was erased. This intentional act permanently deprives Mobilight
and the Court of the evidence contained on said SIM card.
26

Mobilight

maintains

the

identities

of

its

suppliers

as

confidential information. Using Mobilight's confidential supplier list,
Mr.

Rowe,

Cactus

Jack,

and

DayNight

have

contacted

key

Mobilight

suppliers about gaining a supply of specific components for the DayNight
light towers.

The Court finds that although the suppliers maintain

public businesses and are accessible through various public media, Mr.
Rowe,

Cactus

Jack

and

DayNight' s

source

Mobilight's confidential information.

of

the

suppliers

is

from
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(1) Due to their intimate knowledge and possession of various

of Mobilight's confidential proprietary information, including its trade
secrets; (2) due to the fact that the KK Machmery/DayNight joint venture
directly competes with Mobilight m
(3) due to the fact

the portable light tower industry;

that Cactus Jack has already

Mobilight1s largest customers m

contacted

two of

Australia, DESS and Fortescue; (4) due

to the fact that Mr. Rowe has already contacted some of Mobilight's
suppliers, including, but not limited to MetalFab, Henderson Wheel, and
Anxter International; (5) due to the fact that Mr. Rowe refused to return
Mobilight's confidential information contained on his laptop computer
hard drive to Mobilight, and thereafter knowingly and

intentionally

destroyed said laptop computer; and (6) due to the fact that Mr. Rowe
refused to return control of the

(801) 755-9395 telephone number to

Mobilight, and then erased the data from the SIM card before returning
the same to Mobilight; the Court finds that Mr. Rowe and Cactus Jack will
use and/or have used, and disclose and/or have disclosed Mobillght's
confidential proprietary information, including its trade secrets,

m

their work for the KK Machmery/DayNight joint venture

The Court finds

that, (l) the laptop computer DayNight's employee, Mr

Rowe, used while

Mr. Rowe was employed with Mobilight was purposely dropped off the roof
of DayNight's building and was then thrown away
laptop computer was videotaped
acknowledged

The destruction of the

That during the videotape, Cactus Jack

"destroying any harmful evidence "

That destruction of

DAYNIGHT V. MOBI-LIGHT
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evidence supports a reasonable inference of the threatened use and/or use
of Mobilight's confidential information under the Utah Uniform Trade
Secret Act, U.C.A. § 13-24-1, et seq. and under the agreements of the
parties;

(ii) DayNight has used at least three Vendors that Mobilight

also uses;

(iii) Cactus Jack acknowledged

that he

has

confidential

information and other property acquired from Mobilight, which he refused
to return to Mobilight until so ordered by the Court; (iv) Cactus Jack
has contacted two of Mobilight's largest customqrs in Australia, i.e.
DESS and Fortescue and offered to sell them DayNight portable light
towers; and, (v) DayNight has assembled a portable light tower that is
similar to and is derived from Mobilight's portable light towers design
and confidential information in several ways, including, but not limited
to, the following: (1) incorporation of a "diamond" plated front panel
and laser-cut rear panel; (2) use of a hydraulically-operated light mast;
(3) use of the exact same make and model gasoline motor as Mobilight uses
in its portable light towers; (4) use of a bank of parabolic reflector
lights very similar in design to that of Mobilight's design; (5) use of
push-pull cables similar to those used in Mobilight's towers; and (6) use
of an axle assembly and electrical

cables similar to those used in

Mobilight's towers.
28

The Court further finds there are some differences in the

design and specifications of the Mobililght light towers and the DayNight
prototype

light tower.

Those differences include the hydraulic ram
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designs, lighting mast designs, chassis structure, light system designs,
stabilizer

legs

and

others.

Despite

these

differences

and

the

availability of some light tower design and specifications information
available in the public domain, Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack and DayNight's
prototype is a derivative of and sufficiently similar to Mobilight's
light tower which further establishes that Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack and
DayNight have used Mobilight's confidential proprietary information and
trade secrets for their own benefit.
29

Mobilight, through communication from its counsel, reasonably

attempted to obtain confirmation from KK Machinery, Mr. Rowe, and Cactus
Jack that they would work to maintain the confidentiality of Mobilight's
confidential proprietary information and trade secrets, and would not use
such information in competition with Mobilight; but KK Machinery, Mr.
Rowe, and Cactus Jack failed to offer any such confirmation, serving as
further evidence of their
confidential proprietary

threat of misappropriation

of

Mobilight's

information and trade secrets. In fact, KK

Machinery refused to communicate further about the matter, other than
through litigation.
30

The DayNight defendants collectively in their confidentiality

agreements with Mobilight acknowledge that Mobilight has confidential,
proprietary, trade secret information.
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Mobilight holds trade secrets as defined in the Utah Uniform

Trade Secret Act, § 13-24-1, et seq., and paragraph 2a of the Property
Protection Agreements.
32

Consistent with the definition of the meaning of "status quo"

with respect to applications for injunctive relief as provided in Schrier
v. Univ. of Colorado, 427 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir. 2005), the Court is
satisfied that this preliminary injunction will maintain the status quo,
as

defined

in

the

Schrier

decision.

The

Court

further

finds

that

Mobilight's request for a preliminary injunction is not subject to any
"heightened burden" scrutiny.
33

If Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack, KK Machinery ^nd/or DayNight are not

restrained from misappropriating Mobilight's Confidential Information in
the KK Machinery/DayNight joint venture in the design, manufacture, and
sale of portable light towers, Mobilight will suffer irreparable harm
because it could be injured by losing up to 100% of its sales to its
customers in Australia, especially considering KK Machinery's physical
presence in Australia and KK Machinery's detailed knowledge of Mobilight
customers it gained through the Distributor Agreement.
34

Irreparable harm to Mobilight is heightened by (1) the fact

that Mobilight

is essentially a single product line business, has a

significant fixed cost base for its facilities an$ employee expenses and
a decrease in revenue due to unfair or illegal competition will impair
Mobilight's ability to meet its fixed obligations and,

consequently,

PAGE 12

DAYNIGHT V. MOBI-LIGHT

threaten its financial viability;

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

(2) by the fact that Mobilight has

expended significant funds to develop markets for its products with the
anticipation it will recoup those funds through future sales, and unfair
or illegal interference with those relationships will cause Mobilight to
lose

the value

of

its marketing

investment;

(3) by

the

fact

that

DayNight, Cactus Jack, and KK Machinery have contacted two of Mobilight's
largest customers m

Australia, DESS and Fortescue, and allowing said

parties to continue to sell to such customers, could cause Mobilight to
lose 18%-20% of its overall sales; and (4) if Mobilight's future sales
are unfairly or illegally interfered with, Mobilight will lose the value
of

Mobilight's

significant

historical

research

and

development

investment, which Mobilight anticipated it would recoup through future
sales.
35

A preliminary injunction order versus Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack,

KK Machinery,
Mobilight's

and DayNight

Confidential

enjoining

Information

them
is

from using
necessary

or

to

disclosing

prevent

the

unauthorized disclosure and use of Mobilight's Confidential Information,
as

the unauthorized

Information

will

disclosure

cause

and use

injury,

as

above

of Mobilight's
set

forth,

Confidential

that

would

be

irreparable, because it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to
quantify such injury and/or damages

Unauthorized use and disclosure of

such information will cause Mobilight to lose product sales and market
share for the reasons stated above

This preliminary injunction targets

DAYNIGHT V. MOBI-LIGHT
the
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confidential,

proprietary,

trade

secret

information described herein and not the general knowledge, experience,
memory and skill of Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack, DayNight and KK Machinery.

65A,

36

The Court has considered all of the criteria under U.R.C.P.

and

finds

that

Mobilight

has

established

irreparable

injury

warranting relief under Rule 65A.
37

The Court has considered the balance of harms factor under

U.R.C.P. 65A, and finds that this factor weighs in] favor of Mobilight in
recognition that Mobilight has expended millions o£ dollars in developing
its business and the value of the confidential information. The Court
finds that if the preliminary injunction requested is not issued, the
value of loss of Mobilight's confidential information and the competitive
edge that confidential information gives Mobilight in the marketplace
would be extremely difficult to measure. In comparison, the Court finds
that the potential harm to the DayNight defendants collectively, and the
harm to Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack, DayNight, and KK Machinery individually
is outweighed by the potential harm to Mobilight

if the preliminary

injunction is not issued. KK Machinery has other business activities that
will not be impacted if the requested temporary restraining order is
issued.
38

The Court has considered the public interest impact criteria

under U.R.C.P. 65A, and finds that there is a strong public policy and
public interest in protecting trade secret information and enforcing
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the

requested

preliminary

injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest.
39

The Court recognizes that the requested preliminary injunction

may have a negative impact on competition which can at times be adverse
to the public interest, but with respect to the circumstances, restraint
is necessary because the DayNight defendants are competing based upon the
use of confidential information and trade secrets belonging to Mobilight.
This unauthorized use of Mobilight's confidential, proprietary, trade
secret information is distinguishable from a classic

non-competition

agreement where one is prohibited from engaging in employment with a
competitor,

therefore,

the

usual

time

and

area

restrictions

on

restrictive employment covenants have no application.
40

The Court finds that there is a substantial likelihood that

Mobilight will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim.
41

The

agreements

between

Mobilight

and

DayNight

defendants

provides for the recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing party.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes as
a matter of law:
1

DayNight defendants have, individually and/or collectively

breached their common law duty of loyalty, the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets
Act,

and

the

specific

agreements with Mobilight.

applicable

provisions

of

their

respective

DAYNIGHT V. MOBI-LIGHT
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That Mobilight will suffer immediate and irreparable injury,
or damage, including

Mobilight's
Mobilight

trade
due

the publication

secrets, and

to

the

loss of

wrongful

and unauthorized

sales

disclosure

and market

anc| use

of

use of

share

for

Mobilight's

confidential proprietary information and intellectual property, unless
the preliminary injunction requested by Mobilight is issued.
3

That the Court has considered the balance of harms analysis

under Rule

65A,

recognizes

that Mobilight

has expended millions

of

dollars in developing its confidential information, finds that the value
of loss of Mobilight's confidential information a:qd the competitive edge
that confidential information gives Mobilight in the marketplace would
be

extremely

difficult

to measure,

and

finds

that

the

actual

and

threatened injury to Mobilight outweighs whatever damage the preliminary
injunction may cause the parties who are restrained or enjoined.
4

The preliminary injunction will not be adverse to the public

interest.
5

There is a substantial likelihood that Mobilight will prevail

on the merits of its underlying claims, or the case presents serious
issues on the merits which should be the subject of further litigation.
6

Mobilight has not previously applied to any judicial officer

for similar relief.
7
costs

That Mobilight is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and
incurred

in

obtaining

the

Temporary

Restraining

Order

dated
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September 16, 2008, as well as this Preliminary Injunction, as provided
for in the Utah Uniform Trade Secret Act and the respective written
agreements between DayNight defendants and Mobilight, in an amount to be
shown hereafter by affidavit pending final resolution and decision on the
merits of all claims, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that, effective as of November 14, 2008, and pursuant
to U.C.R.P. 65A, plaintiff and counterclaim defendant DayNight, LLC, and
third-party defendants William Cory Rowe, Cactus Jack, and KK Machinery,
and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those
persons

in

restrained

active
and

concert

enjoined

or

participation

with

them,

as follows until a trial on

are

hereby

the merits of

Mobilight's underlying claims in this matter.
A.
not

use

or

DayNight, Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack, and KK Machinery shall
disclose

any

of

Mobilight's

confidential

proprietary

information (including but not limited to Mobilight's technical design
information, supplier information, customer information, manufacturing
information, and business information);
B.

Mr. Rowe shall not work in any capacity

for the KK

Machinery/DayNight light tower joint venture;
C.

Cactus Jack shall not work for the KK Machinery/DayNight

light tower joint venture;

DAYNIGHT V

MOBI-LIGHT
D.

immediately,

PAGE 17

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack, KK Machinery, and DayNight shall
if they have not already returned to Mobilight, all of

Mobilight's Confidential Information m

their possession, including but

not limited to, return of Mobilight's files and data from Mr. Rowe' s
laptop computer hard drive, or any other electronic or printed medium,
and including all photographs KK Machinery and/or Cactus Jack and/or Mr.
Rowe took while visiting or working on Mobilight's premises; and all
copies and reproductions of the same, electronic or otherwise.
E.
prohibited

DayNight, KK Machinery, Cactus Jadk and W. Cory Rowe are

from

making

any

light

tower

product

derived

from

the

confidential information and creative works of Mobilight.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Mobilight is entitled to reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred m

obtaining the Temporary Restraining

Order dated September 16, 2008, as well as this Preliminary Injunction,
as provided for m

the Utah Uniform Trade Secret Act and the respective

written agreements between DayNight

defendants

and Mobilight,

in an

amount to be shown hereafter by affidavit pending final resolution and
decision on the merits of all claims, unless otherwise ordered by the
Court.
THIS ORDER is issued on

day of November, 20 0 8 at the time of

THIS ORDER shall be immediately served upon DayNight, Mr. Rowe,
Cactus Jack, and KK Machinery
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THIS ORDER shall be filed forthwith in the clerk's office and
entered of record.
THIS ORDER shall remain in effect until the Court
decision on the merits after a jury trial on this matter,.
Dated this

j j

day of November/ 2008

i
TYR01TO E . MEDLEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

renders its
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions

Injunction Order, to the following, this N^A

of

L|aw,

and

Preliminary

day of November, 2008:

Richard F. Ensor
Attorney for Plaintiff
170 South Main Street, Suite 1125
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1639
Rinehart L. Peshell
Richard M. Matheson
Jonathon D. Parry
Attorneys for Defendant
5383 South 900 East, Suite 205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAYNIGHT, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO.

080913997

Plaintiff & Counterclaim
Defendant,
vs,
MOBI-LIGHT, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Defendant & Counterclaim
Plaintiff,
vs,
KKK MACHINERY PTY, LTD., a foreign
corporation, W. CORY ROWE, an
individual, and PAUL "CACTUS JACK"
LA MARR, an individual,
Third Party Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on January 5, 2009,
in connection with the defendant and counter-claim plaintiff's ("MobiLight") Motion for Sanctions.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the

Court took the matter under advisement to further consider the parties'
written submissions, the relevant legal authority and counsel's oral
argument.

Being now fully informed, the Court rules as stated herein.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS
In its Motion for Sanctions, Mobi-Light seeks the entry of Default
Judgment

against

the

plaintiff

("DayNight")

and

the

defendants with respect to the First, Second, Third,
Sixth, Tenth and Thirteenth Claims

third-party

Fourth, Fifth,

for Relief of its First Amended

Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint.

These claims pertain to the

alleged misappropriation by DayNight and the third-party defendants of
Mobi-Light's confidential information, including information that was
allegedly

downloaded

onto

a laptop

computer by Mobi-Light 7 s

former

employee, third-party defendant W. Cory Rowe ("Mr. Rowe") .
Mobi-Light

asserts

that

direct

evidence

of

the

alleged

misappropriation would have been contained on the laptop computer, which
was destroyed by Mr. Rowe and third-party defendant Paul "Cactus Jack"
LaMarr

("Cactus Jack") on July 30, 2008.

Mobi-Light

argues that the

appropriate sanction for the destruction of this evidence is the entry
of Default Judgment. While recognizing that Default Judgment is a severe
sanction, Mobi-Light argues that lesser sanctions will not remedy the
damage caused by the destruction of the computer.
Before considering the parties' respective legal arguments, it is
worth noting

that

this matter

was previously

before

this

Court in

connection with a Preliminary Injunction hearing conducted on October 7,
8 and 30, 2008.

Subsequently,

the Court

issued

Findings

of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Injunction Order, dated November 14,
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Findings made by the Court in connection with the

Preliminary Injunction hearing are also relevant to the present Motion
for Sanctions.
To summarize, the Court found that Mr. Rowe had
learned

Mobi-Light's

confidential

information,

contained in the form of electronic data.

access to and

including

information

The Court also found that

while still employed for Mobi-Light, Mr. Rowe assisted Cactus Jack on
various

endeavors

associated

with

DayNight.

After

leaving

his

employment, Mr. Rowe was asked to return the hard drive from his laptop
computer.
The Court found that Mr. Rowe's "refusal to return the hard drive
from his

laptop

computer which

contained Mobi-Light's

confidential,

proprietary trade secret information supports the reasonable inference
and

finding

that

Mr.

protected information."

Rowe

intended

to wrongfully

use

Mobi-Light's

(Findings and Conclusions at para. 21).

The

Court went on to find that M o ] n July 30, 2008, Mr. Rowe and Cactus Jack
intentionally destroyed Mr. Rowe's laptop computer and hard drive . . .
The intentional destruction of the laptop computer permanently deprives
Mobi-Light
computer."

and

the

Court

of

the

evidence

contained

on

the

laptop

(Findings and Conclusions at para. 22).

In light of the foregoing, the Court evaluates the parties' legal
positions with respect to the issue of whether Mr. Rowe's and Cactus
Jack's intentional destruction of the laptop computer warrants the entry
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of Default Judgment against DayNight and the third-party defendants.
Mobi-Light asserts that the Court's authority to impose sanctions for the
destruction of discoverable evidence derives from Rule 37(g) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 37(g) states:

(g) Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits
the inherent power of the court to take any action authorized
by Subdivision (b)(2) if a party destroys, conceals, alters,
tampers with or fails to preserve a document, tangible item,
electronic data or other evidence in violation of a duty.
Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose
sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide
electronically stored information lost as a result of the
routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.
A secondary source of authority for the imposition of sanctions for the
destruction of evidence is the evidentiary doctrine of spoliation.

The

general rule of this doctrine is that the bad faith destruction of
evidence relevant to the proof of an issue gives rise to an adverse
inference that the party who destroyed the evidence

did so to hide

relevant information. See Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 56 F.2d 524, 551
(7th Cir. 1985); Schmid v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79
(3d Cir. 1994) (The imposition of sanctions for the alleged spoliation
of evidence involves a balancing of several considerations: the degree
of fault of the party responsible for the loss of the evidence, the
degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party, and the necessity of
deterring similar conduct by other parties in the future) .
In deciding whether a spoliation inference should be applied, courts
look to the following factors: (1) The evidence is in the adverse party's
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intentionally destroys

the evidence,

rather than simply disposing of it as part of a routine process; (3) the
evidence destroyed is relevant; and

(4) the adverse party could have

foreseen that the evidence was discoverable.

See Scott v. IBM Corp., 196

F.R.D. 233, 248 (D.N.J. 2000); See also Aramburu v. The Boeing Co., 112
F.3d 1398, 1407 ("The adverse inference must be predicated on the bad
faith of the party destroying the records.

Mere negligence in losing or

destroying the records is not enough because it does not support an
inference of the consciousness of a weak case.").
In addition to a spoliation inference, there are other possible
sanctions available for the destruction of evidence, with dismissal or
Default Judgment being the most severe.

A number of these cases appear

to fall under the authority granted to courts under various versions of
Rule 37, with overlapping

discussion of general spoliation

doctrine

principles.
In surveying these cases, the Court notes that

in addition to

finding bad faith, courts also assess whether the violating

party's

misconduct

drastic

has

caused

substantial

sanctions would not be appropriate.
1021 (5th Cir. 1990) .

prejudice

and

that

less

Pressey v. Patterson, 898 F.2d 1018,

The Seventh Circuit, for instance, has stressed

that the sanction of default

(in the case of a defendant) or dismissal

(in the case of a plaintiff) is to be applied only in extreme scenarios
or when lesser sanctions have proven futile. Ellinqsworth v. Chrysler,
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665 F.2d 180, 185 (7th Cir. 1981). However, " x a default judgment is an
appropriate sanction if the sanctioned party acted with willfulness, bad
faith or fault' . . . The Seventh Circuit finds 'fault' in the context of
sanctions if the violative conduct is unreasonable - it does not rely on
the party's subjective motivation for the violative action.

Fault could

also entail 'gross negligence, ' or Na flagrant disregard7 of the duty to
"preserve

and

monitor

the

condition"

of material

evidence."

Kucala

Enters, v. Auto Wax Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8833, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(Callaghan) 487 (N.D. 111. May 23, 2003) (internal citations omitted).
Having considering the foregoing legal authority, the Court first
rules that the fact that there was no discovery Order in place when the
laptop computer was destroyed is irrelevant. The Court interprets Rule
37(g) as recognizing

the duty to preserve

evidence

and

the Court's

inherent power to sanction the destruction of evidence which a party can
reasonably anticipate as being discoverable.

The Court is satisfied that

there is no need for the Court to first order preservation in order for
Rule 37(g) to be applicable.

Indeed, there is no such limitation on the

Court's inherent authority under Rule 37(g)
outline

in Rule

37(b)(2)

where

a party

has

to impose
destroyed

the sanctions
discoverable

evidence.
Next,

the

Court

rules

that

the requirements

sanction of Default Judgment are met in this case.

for

imposing

the

First, Mr. Rowe and

Cactus Jack knew or could reasonably have anticipated that the laptop

DAYNIGHT V. MOBI-LIGHT
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computer would be used as potential evidence in the litigation with MobiLight.

Indeed,

Cactus

Jack

in

the

video

of

the

July

30,

2008,

destruction of the laptop, states that he and Mr. Rowe were "about to
destroy any final, potential harmful evidence that might link us to any
sort of lawsuit to Mobi-Light regarding their concerns about intellectual
property."

Clearly, these parties had a duty to preserve this evidence

and yet they chose to willfully and in bad faith destroy the laptop in
order to permanently deprive Mobi-Light and this Court of the evidence
contained on the laptop.

The videotaping of the destruction of the

laptop confirms these parties' flagrant disregard of the duty to preserve
and the potential consequences of their actions.
Further, the evidence at issue was highly relevant to Mobi-Light's
allegations and claims and Mr. Rowe and Cactus Jack were well aware of
this

when

they

destroyed

the

laptop.

Indeed,

the

relevance

and

foreseeability of discovery of the evidence contained on the laptop was
readily apparent to these parties.
Additionally, the Court determines that Mr. Rowe's and Cactus Jack's
destructive acts will cause substantial prejudice to Mobi-Light.

For

instance, because the evidence contained on the hard drive of the laptop
has been destroyed, the jury would be left to speculate regarding the
nature and extent of Mobi-Light's confidential information contained on
the hard drive and whether this information was actually being accessed,
transferred and/or used.
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The final issue before the Court is the severity of the sanction to
be imposed.

As demonstrated by case law discussed above, the severity

of the sanction imposed correlates with a party's level of culpability.
In this case, there is direct evidence of Mr. Rowe's and Cactus Jack's
intentional destruction of relevant evidence for the purpose of hiding
potential damaging information.

Further, there is a significant level

of prejudice to Mobi-Light because the evidence at issue goes to the
heart of Mobi-Light's claims and is the central and most direct evidence
of DayNight's and the third-party defendants' alleged wrongdoing. Next,
the

actual

videotaped

destruction

of

the

evidence

creates

an

extraordinary circumstance which demonstrates Mr. Rowe's and Cactus
Jack's disregard for the Court and the judicial process.

Considering

these factors in their totality, the Court is persuaded that the level
of culpability is such that Default Judgment is warranted and that a less
drastic

sanction

circumstances.

would

not

Accordingly,

be

appropriate

Mobi-Light's

under

Motion

for

these

unique

Sanctions

granted.
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court.

l^
Dated this **• /

/
day of March, 2009.

TYRONE E. MEDLEY
DISTg/ECT COURT JUDGE

is

DAYNIGHT V. MOBI-LIGHT

PAGE 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this ^> ^ day of March,
2009:

Richard F. Ensor
Attorney for Plaintiff
170 South Main Street, Suite 1125
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1639
Rinehart L. Peshell
Richard M. Matheson
Jonathon D. Parry
Attorneys for Defendant
5383 South 900 East, Suite 205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

^Q/ftftn

TabC

ADDENDUM C

Rinehart L. Peshell, #2573
Richard M. Matheson, #5510
Jonathon D. Parry, Of Counsel #10457
Matheson & Peshell, LLC
5383 South 900 East, Suite 205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 747-0477
Fax: (801)747-0480
Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaim Plaintiff
and Third-Party Plaintiff Mobilight, Inc.

IMAGED
ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS .
DATE

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAYNIGHT, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company,
Plaintiff & Counterclaim Defendant,
FINAL JUDGMENT
v.
MOBI-LIGHT, INC., a Utah corporation,

Case No. 080913997

Defendant & Counterclaim Plaintiff,

Judge Medley

V.

KK MACHINERY PTY, LTD., a foreign
corporation, W. CORY ROWE, an individual,
and PAUL "CACTUS JACK" LA MARR, an
individual,
Final Judgment @J

Third-Party Defendants,
v.
MOBILIGHT, INC. and ROSS JOHNSON,

JD30266348

080913997 DAYNIGHT LLC,

Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants.

1

Daaes.

,

This action came regularly before the Court on the 5th day of January, 2009 for hearing
regarding Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Mobi-Light, Inc.'s ("Mobilight") Motion for
Sanctions requesting default judgment against Counterclaim Defendant DayNight, LLC and ThirdParty Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd. (an Australian company), W. Cory Rowe, and Paul
"Cactus Jack" La Marr.
Counterclaim Defendant DayNight, LLC, and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty,
Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul "Cactus Jack" La Marr have each voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of this Court by filing their Answer to Mobi-Light, Inc.'s First Amended Counterclaim
and Third-Party Complaint and also by filing pleadings and presenting evidence and argument in this
matter.
Third-Party Defendants Paul "Cactus Jack" La Marr and W. Cory Rowe voluntarily and
personally appeared, and Richard F. Ensor, counsel for Counterclaim Defendant DayNight, LLC,
and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul "Cactus Jack" La
Marr, appeared at the time and place set for the hearing. Counterclaim Plaintiff and Third-Party
Plaintiff Mobilight, Inc. was represented by Jonathon D. Parry and Rinehart L. Peshell, and appeared
at the time and place set for hearing.
The Court, on March 25, 2009, filed its Memorandum Decision granting Mobi-Light, Inc.'s
Motion for Sanctions and default judgment for Mobi-Light, Inc. against Counterclaim Defendant
DayNight, LLC and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul
"Cactus Jack" La Marr with respect to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and
Thirteenth Claims for Relief of Mobi-Light, Inc.'s First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party
Complaint. As detailed in the Court's Memorandum Decision, the Court granted Mobi-Light, Inc.'s
Motion for Sanctions and granted Mobi-Light, Inc. default judgment on the grounds that
Counterclaim Defendant DayNight, LLC and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W.
Cory Rowe, and Paul "Cactus Jack" La Marr intentionally destroyed W. Cory Rowe's laptop
2

computer, that the destroyed computer was evidence central to proving Mobi-Light, Inc.'s claims,
and which destruction severely prejudiced Mobi-Light, Inc.'s ability to prove its case.
On June 18, 2009, Counterclaim Plaintiff Mobi-Light, Inc. filed its Motion for Entry of Final
Judgment, supported by affidavit of its counsel. On July 8, 2009, Counterclaim Defendant
DayNight, LLC and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul
"Cactus Jack" La Marr filed their Memorandum In Opposition To Mobilight, Inc.'s Motion For Final
Entry of Default Judgment. On July 27, 2009, Counterclaim Plaintiff Mobi-Light, Inc. filed its
Reply in Support of Motion for Entry of Final Judgment, supported by counsel's second affidavit.
On September 21, 2009, the Court held an oral argument hearing regarding Mobi-Light, Inc.'s
Motion for Entry of Final Judgment, and took the matter under advisement. On November 10, 2009,
the Court issued its Memorandum Decision granting Mobi-Light, Int.'s Motion for Entry of Final
Judgment. In that Memorandum Decision, the Court ruled, inter alia, as follows:
1. That the claims remaining in the case do not overlap factually or legally with the claims
Mobilight seeks judgment upon, and finding no just reason for delay, granted Mobilight's
request for Rule 54(b) certification.
2. That Mobilight is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs, and that the amount of
such fees and costs requested are reasonable in light of the complexity of the case and the
scope of the litigation.
3. That the form of the Final Judgment has the requisite specificity and properly focuses on
the use or disclosure of trade secrets, and that consistent with the Court's prior decisions,
there is a "cognizable danger" that the plaintiff may further misappropriate Mobilight's
trade secrets in the future, particularly since the trade secrets which were misappropriated
were contained in an electronic format.
THEREFORE, having reviewed the record in this matter; and, having considered the Second
Affidavit of Rinehart L. Peshell pertaining to Mobi-Light's attorney's fees and costs incurred in
3

pursuing Mobi-Light, Inc.'s First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Thirteenth Claims
for Relief, and, otherwise being fully advised in the premises and for good cause appearing:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. Mobi-Light, Inc. is granted final judgment against Counterclaim Defendant DayNight,
LLC and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul "Cactus Jack"
La Marr with respect to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Thirteenth Claims
for Relief of Mobi-Light, Inc.'s First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint.
2. Mobi-Light, Inc. is granted a permanent injunction against Counterclaim Defendant
DayNight, LLC and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul
"Cactus Jack" La Marr enjoining them, and each of them, to cease and desist from using or
disclosing to any other person or entity any of Mobi-Light, Inc.'s Confidential Information,
including its trade secrets.
3.

Mobi-Light, Inc. is granted a permanent injunction against Third-Party Defendants

W. Cory Rowe and Paul "Cactus Jack" La Marr enjoining them, and each of them, from working for
the KK Machinery/DayNight light tower joint venture.
4.

Mobi-Light, Inc. is granted a permanent injunction against Counterclaim Defendant

DayNight, LLC and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul
"Cactus Jack" La Marr enjoining them, and each of them, to return to Mobi-Light, Inc. all of its
Confidential Information in their possession, including, but not limited to, return of Mobi-Light,
Inc.'s files and data from Mr. Rowe's laptop computer hard drive or any other electronic or printed
medium, and including all photographs KK Machinery, Cactus Jack, and Mr. Rowe took while
visiting or working in Mobi-Light, Inc.'s premises, and all copies and reproductions of the same,
electronic or otherwise.
5.

Mobi-Light, Inc. is awarded and Counterclaim Defendant DayNight, LLC and Third-

Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul "Cactus Jack'" La Marr shall
4

pay to iV1 »hi f iszht. in'.* ihr 1*^/! 'ixed-^um Judgment Amount '*f $120,692.07 in court costs and
attorne} ^ ieeb HULL:: .

..

._.„L.:a. . :. . :

a.

Attorney's fees incurred from May 23, 2008 through May 22, 2009

^~ ! ! 1 3.75

b.

Costs incurred from May 23, 2008 throw* M.r 22, 20(-

S30.37S.32
>'70.6O2.n7

6. The Judgment Amount shall bear interest at 2.4% per annum, in accordance with Utah

incurred hereafter in collecting said Judgment Amount, is paid in full;
r

he fixed sum Judgment .Amount of $120,692.07 shall be augmented in the amount of

i. <i ^>:.*J . .*.-.•_. attorney's fees expended in enforcing and collecting said Ji ldgment 1: y
execution or otherwise, as shall be established hereafter by affidavit; and,
h

i^rsuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Judgment represents the

express oc.-.niiiui-* \.

- . :..-: • ••:'. ;.••:

a :.i,a: a^nicM oet\\~_ i:\c ^L ^ve-named

parties for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,, Sixth, Tenth and Thirteenth Claims for Relief of
Mobi-I ight, Inc.'s First Amended Counterclaim a ^d \\\\: r-'\,

•.

^ '.i\y

r,

\ '"^;-: •". v.F ;> •

certification pursuant to Kulc :• r\ r.* is appropriate because me ,;!aim=» remaining between the parties
in this Case No. 080913997 are separate from and do not overlap wiih -he First. Second, fhin:.
Fourth. ' :f*:- <\\'h ! .>:it'!

- '1 i teenth CI; iii ns for R elief of ,)\ lobi I igl it, Inc 5s First A n lencled

( vurUer^iaiin ana .;,. VM*JI!> Complaint.
\\
\\

w
w
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9. This Judgment is not subject to revision, unless and until it is augmented as provided for
herein.
JUDGMENT entered this / ^

day of

/Lcv-^

2009.

BY THE COURT:
C

7*WE/7?

Hon. Tyrpne Medley, District Judge
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I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing Final Judgment this/^" day of
November, 2009, by hand delivery, and via facsimile, to the following:

Richard F. Esnor
Vantus Law Group
3165 East Millrock Drive, Ste. 160
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
801-931-2500 r-H^n-i-
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